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THE ROLE OF EQUIPOISE IN FAMILY LAW
Deborah Cantrell
"In a revolution.. . the most difficult part to invent is the end."
Alexis de Tocqueville
Abstract
Scholars reviewing family law over the last twenty years have
described the field as having undergone a revolution. While true, both
scholars and front-line family law advocates have failed to invent a
satisfying end to the revolution. This Article takes up that challenge and
offers a novel way forward,It identifies two translationchallenges that
have prevented the revolutionfrom reachingits end. The first challenge
is translatingreform so that its benefits accrue equally across all kinds
of participants-richand poor, those with lawyers and those without.
The second challenge is translatingtheory into on-the-groundpractices
useful to family courts. The Article uses the collaborative law movement
as an example of the translation problem of unequal access and
distribution, and scholarshipon family law and emotions as an example
of the translationproblem of crafting useful on-the-ground practices.
To solve both translation challenges, the Article proposes that courts
and court-annexed programs build out practices of equipoise. The
Article defines equipoise as a mode of processing information and
emotions that disrupts habituated and unhelpful interactions between
persons and instead encourages thoughtful engagement with emotions,
resulting in reduced adversarialnessand constructive problem solving.
It considers examples of equipoise practices, some commonplace (such
as role-playing) and some more esoteric (like meditation) and
demonstrates how such practices can efficiently and productively be
translated into court processes that are available to all family law
participants. As a result, the Article demonstrates how to invent a
satisfying end to the family law revolution.
INTRODUCTION

Family law has undergone a revolution. Where family law once committed
fully to the adversary process, it now leads with processes designed to foster joint
problem-solving. Where family law once eschewed the role of emotions, it now
. C 2012 Deborah Cantrell, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
Special thanks to Clare Huntington, Sarah Krakoff, and Scott Peppet. Thanks also to
colleagues at scholarship workshops at Colorado Law and University of Denver College of
Law.
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acknowledges the presence and influences of a full cycle of emotions within
families. But, as de Tocqueville advised, the biggest challenge in a revolution is to
create a satisfying end. The family law revolution now must contend with that
challenge.
For family law, the challenge fundamentally is one of translation. Scholars,
legislatures and courts have all embraced the theories of the revolution.' For
example, scholars have written eloquently and at a sustained level for twenty years
about why family law should eschew adversarialness and acknowledge the role of
a full range of emotions. 2 Legislatures have amended family codes to note
legislative intention to support "amicable" resolution of disputes. Courts have
embraced and mandated alternative dispute processes in family matters.4 After this
'See, e.g.,
IN FAMILY LAW

JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION

(2000) (noting, among other developments, the "legal revolution" in

family law).
2 See generally

ROBERT E. EMERY, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHILDREN AND DIVORCE:
DEALING WITH THE EMOTIONS SO YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN CAN THRIVE (2004) (from a

therapeutic view, demonstrating the risks of adversary process and the need for conflict
resolution to acknowledge full range of emotions); Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein,
In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System, 42
FAM. CT. REV. 203, 203-07 (2004) (describing shortcomings of adversary system in family
cases); Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1254-86 (2008)
(noting need for an expanded role of emotions in family law and resulting rejection of
adversary process); Elizabeth S. Scott, ParentalAutonomy and Children's Welfare, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1071, 1081 (2003) (acknowledging that law reform related to
child custody guided in part by goal of tamping down adversarialness between parents);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, ParentalPreference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV.
615, 632 (1992) (acknowledging that reducing conflict in divorce cases is an important way
of protecting the well-being of children and parents); Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution
and the Post-divorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REv. 363,
363-65 (2009) (detailing "paradigm shift" in family law as including moves away from
adversarial process and acknowledgment of role of emotions). But see Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1581 (1991)
(raising concerns that mandatory mediation failed to recognize its disempowering potential
for some women); Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate?": A Critique ofInformality
in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 339, 351-52 (1999) (in the
context of child abuse and neglect proceedings, complaining that informality in
proceedings unreasonably privileges repeat players and undermines rights of respondent
mother).
3 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311; 14-10-124(b)(8) (West 2011). See also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-104.5 (West 2011) (effective July 1, 1988) ("The general
assembly recognizes that it is in the best interests of the parties to a marriage in which a
dissolution has been granted and in which there are children of the marriage for the parties
to be able to resolve disputes that arise subsequent to the dissolution in an amicable and
fair manner" (emphasis added)).
4 For example, Colorado's Judicial Branch has established an Office of Dispute
Resolution through which mediation services are provided in family law and in other areas.
See Office of Dispute Resolution, COLO. JUD. DEP'T, http://www.courts.state.co.us
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important immersion period in theories of change, the struggle with which
scholars, legislatures and courts must now contend is translating those theories so
that they are alive and fruitful for the multitude of real spouses, parents, and
children involved in family law matters.
The translation problem comes in two varieties. The first is translating the
revolution so that its benefits extend equally to all kinds of participants-those
with money and those without; those with lawyers and those without. The second
is translating theoretical conclusions into clear goals that are understandable to
participants and can be effectuated by family courts. The family law revolution
suffers from both problems.
This Article uses collaborative law as an illustration of the first translation
problem. Collaborative law has dramatically refrained the role lawyers can and
should play in enabling spouses to divorce cooperatively, with commitments to
mutual gain, and without the need for a court to mandate results. The movement,
however, is hindered by its limited use. That is partly a result of the requirement
that participants must be represented by counsel and partly a result of other
associated costs. Both hindrances are confirmed by data showing that collaborative
law is used predominantly by well-resourced couples and by nationwide data
showing that family courts face high numbers of pro se participants.
The Article illustrates the second translation problem of taking theory and
articulating it into clear goals by examining what it means to recognize a dynamic
and fluid cycle of emotions at play in family disputes. As noted, scholars,
legislatures, and courts have recognized the need for family law to help litigants
move beyond acrimony and instead develop functional working relationships that
will endure long after a court case is closed. Family law now recognizes that a
family's emotions do not resolve just because a court enters a final order. But, it
has struggled to answer whether there is one particular emotional end state to
which family members should strive. For example, scholars have offered
forgiveness and reparation as two possible end goals.7 This Article demonstrates
that neither is satisfactory because each is subject to multiple and contested
definitions.
This Article offers an original and innovative solution to both translation
problems by arguing that family courts and court-related personnel should foster
"practices of equipoise." First, the Article acknowledges the facts on the groundthat family courts work predominantly with pro se parties and that processes like
collaborative law are unavailable to most people. Thus, a successful transformative
solution must be situated within the courts and court-annexed programs in order to
equally and most robustly distribute the benefits of the revolution. Next, the
/Administration/Unit.cfm?Unit-odr (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). See also CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 3160-3165 (West 2011); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.015 (West 2011).
5 Throughout this Article I refer to "family law" broadly, although my examples will
focus on family law developments related to divorce or related to issues as between
unmarried parents.
6
See discussion infra Part II.A.
7 See discussion infra Part II.B.
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Article defines equipoise as a mode of processing information and emotions that
encourages thoughtful engagement with emotions, resulting in reduced
adversarialness and more constructive problem-solving. Instead of focusing on a
particular end state (like forgiveness or reparation) as a goal, the Article argues
that participants need an effective mode of responding to a myriad of situations
that may have multiple emotional valences.
At the core of a practice of equipoise is the idea that much of what is
unhelpful about "bad" interactions between family members are habituated
responses. Examples include spouses who are in the habit of responding to each
other with negative emotions like anger or hurt, or a parent who is in the habit of
responding to a child with irritation. As a practice, equipoise encourages a person
to interrupt those mental habits and to replace them with more intentional,
forward-looking conduct.
The Article demonstrates that it will be both practical and productive for
courts to incorporate equipoise practices into family courts. In other words,
practices of equipoise solve both translation problems that currently prevent the
family law revolution from reaching a satisfactory end. The Article explores
various equipoise practices already nascent within family courts, such as within
court-mandated parenting classes and within mediation. It also explores more
robust forms of equipoise, including yoga, martial arts and meditation. The Article
then scrutinizes whether equipoise is subject to its own definitional and
operationalization challenges, whether it is appropriate to expect individuals to
practice equipoise, and whether courts are institutionally capable of becoming
sufficiently competent in equipoise practices. At its core, the Article demonstrates
forcefully that equipoise makes available to the great numbers of pro se
participants the same benefits of the family law revolution now available only to
those of means.
I. THE CHANGED LANDSCAPE OF FAMILY LAW
Over the past twenty or more years, the landscape of family law has been
thoroughly reworked, particularly as it relates to familial relationship issues such
as parenting time, parental decision-making and financial support for children or
former spouses. Scholars have identified several important components of the
changed landscape. Those include a commitment to tamp down adversarialness
and a recognition that the disentangling and rearranging of familial relationships
implicates "ongoing social and emotional processes." 8 Changing the landscape
was not the result of efforts of a single part of the legal system, but was a goal
embraced equally by legislatures, courts, and the legal profession. In each forum,
the change was motivated in large part by concerns that the old way of doing
things adversely affected the current and long-term well-being of parents and
children involved.9
8

See Singer, supra note 2, at 363-64.

9 Id. at

363.
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While the landscape has changed substantially, it has not yet reached a period
of comfortable repose. During the period of active reform, scholars rightly focused
on the elemental components that were necessary for fruitful change.' 0 Now, as
the field strives for repose, there is an opportunity to reflect more specifically, and
with greater refinement, on what further changes should be impressed upon family
law, on its courts, and on its actors (lawyers, court-annexed personnel, parties and
the like). In order to understand where refinement is needed, it is first important to
more thoroughly describe some of the most potent changes achieved during the
initial period of revolution.
Before the revolution, family cases were understood as' just average civil
cases-no different than personal injury or breach of contract cases. All civil cases
proceeded through the adversary system in the same fashion." The system's repeat
players (lawyers, judges, legislatures) presumed that the benefits of the adversary
system as a dispute resolution process would hold as true in family cases as in any
other civil case.' 2 In other words, they believed that family cases would reach
good, just, and positive results under the adversary system's presumptions that
facts are best developed when both adversaries are ardently represented by skilled
lawyers who press every advantage, and that a decision-maker must remain aloof
and unengaged in order to render the best decision.' 3 The adversary system
embraces the idea that conflict, in a controlled form, is helpful.
Buttressed by social science data indicating that parents and children suffered
physical and psychological harms when conflict was present, the family law
revolution challenged the presumption that family cases should be handled like
any other civil matter.14 The apogee of the revolution's efforts to tamp down
adversarialness is the collaborative law movement. It has profoundly altered the
ways in which a subset of lawyers and their clients proceed with divorces.
Collaborative law turned away from adversarialness along several dimensions. It
'0 See supra note 1.
" See generally John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fittingthe Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 280 (2004) (noting the shift in family law away from traditional
litigation, but acknowledging that traditional litigation may still be a preferred method of

dispute resolution).
12 That repeat family law players did not question the system before the revolution is
demonstrated most easily in the negative. In other words, the assumptions of repeat players
were laid bare through critiques of the ways in which the adversary system failed in family
law cases. For an early critique, see Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet:
The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1997)

(focused on the adversary system's failure in particular when the legal issue was "best
interests" of the child).
See Deborah J. Cantrell, What's Love Got to Do with It?: Contemporary Lessons on
Lawyerly Advocacy from the PreacherMartin Luther King, Jr., 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
296, 302-04 (2010), for a fuller description of the bases of the adversary system.
" See, e.g., EMERY, supra note 2,. ch. 3 (using case studies to detail the emotional and
physical toll of divorce on children); Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 2, at 203-07;
Singer, supra note 2, at 364.
13
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adopted insights from the negotiation field demonstrating that better, longerlasting agreements could be created when parties worked to find shared interests
rather than negotiated from tit-for-tat positional exchanges.15 It looked at
psychology research to understand better how adversarial litigation created
emotional dynamics that were hurtful to spouses, parents, and children who would
have some kind of ongoing relationship despite the adult relationship
terminating.' 6 It rejected the view that the appropriate role for lawyers was that
they should not cooperate with each other.' 7
Building on that learning; collaborative law embraced a profoundly different
method of dispute resolution. It required parties to freely and fully share relevant
information without need for formal discovery requests.' 8 It required the parties
jointly to seek out the advice of a neutral expert to the extent that expert help was
needed for issues such as asset valuation or issues related to children, avoiding the
typical adversararial battle of the experts.19 While the parties each retained
attorneys to advise and counsel them individually, the attorneys themselves
committed to the goals of successfully problem-solving through cooperation and
transparency. 2() Finally, all four participants (both parties and both counsel) agreed
that should the parties be unable to agree on all of the issues related to their
divorce, the attorneys would withdraw from their representations, and the parties
would have to seek new counsel to handle any subsequent litigation.21
Collaborative law understands the parties to be in the best position to
creatively problem solve. 22 However, the movement's focus has been on training
lawyers and other professionals in the ethos and skills called for by collaborative
law processes so that the professionals remain the experts, guiding and counseling
the parties through the process. Under the Uniform Collaborative Law Act

'5 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); PAULINE H. TESLER,
COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT
LITIGATION (2008).

16 TESLER, supra note 15, at 2-3; William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A
Closer Look at an Emerging Practice,4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 356-57 (2004).
17TESLER, supra note 15, at 3-4.

Schwab, supra note 16, at 358.
359-60.
20 Compare TESLER, supra note 15, at ch. 3, with Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of
Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 146 (2008) (noting that collaborative
8

'9 Id. at

lawyers themselves have varying understandings of the levels of cooperation and
transparency to which they are committing).
21 Schwab, supra note 16, at
358.

J. Herbie DiFonzo, A Vision for CollaborativePractice: The Final Report of the
Hofstra Collaborative Law Conference, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 569, 571 (2009)
22

("Collaborative lawyers are engaged in shifting power in the legal system from lawyers to
clients. The goal is to empower clients to achieve the resolution they view as most
appropriate").
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(UCLA), each party must retain her or his own attorney.23 The parties themselves
need not have any particular training to participate. They need only have a
sufficient understanding of the parameters of collaborative law processes so that
their signing of a collaborative law "4-way" 24 contract legitimately reflects
informed consent. 2 5
Over the past twenty years, collaborative law has increasingly gained
traction. There is now an international umbrella organization for collaborative law,
the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals (IACP).26 In the United
States, as of 2009, there were 175 collaborative law practices across the states.2 7 A
study commissioned by IACP reported that over 22,000 lawyers across the globe
have been trained in collaborative law, as well as thousands of mental health and
financial professionals. 28 Reports indicate that "thousands of cases" have been
resolved using collaborative law, in the United States and elsewhere. 2 9
The second potent change made during the period of revolution was a
rejection of family law, particularly marriage and divorce, as a binary system.30
Under the binary model, the state understood its role as defining what two people
must do to start their legal relationship (get married) and what they must do to end
that relationship (get divorced.) Individuals similarly understood themselves as

UNIF. COLLABORATIVE L. ACT in Prefatory Note, The Need for Legal
Representation in CollaborativeLaw, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 447 (2009) [hereinafter
UCLA] ("Under the act, parties can sign a collaborative law participation agreement only if
they engage a collaborative lawyer. Collaborative law is not an option for the selfrepresented").
24 A "4-way" contract refers to the fact that a collaborative law agreement is usually
signed by both parties and their lawyers, with each party and lawyer having various
obligations as to each of the other three signatories. See TESLER, supra note 15, at 161-62.
For a sample collaborative law participation agreement, see also TESLER, supra note 15, at
249-56.
25 Collaborative law scholars and practitioners have spent much time analyzing and
justifying what kind of advice and counsel must be provided by a collaborative lawyer in
order for a client to be able to legitimately give informed consent. While this Article will
not delve further into that issue, fuller discussions may be found in, Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
Legal Ethics and CollaborativePractice Ethics, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 537 (2009); Forrest
S. Mosten & John Lande, The Uniform CollaborativeLaw Act's Contributionto Informed
Client Decision Making in Choosing a Dispute Resolution Process, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV.
611 (2009); Peppet, supra note 20, at 144-46.
26 For a brief history of the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, see
INT'L ACAD. OF COLLABORATIVE PROF'LS, http://www. collaborativepractice.com/
t.asp?M=3&MS=3&T=History (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
27 Yvonne M. Homeyer & Susan L. Amato, Collaborative Law: Good News, Bad
News, or No News?, THE ST. Louis B.J., Spring 2009, at 24.
28 UCLA, supra note 23, at 429.
23

29 Id.

30 See Huntington, supra note 2, at 1246 (2008); see also Singer, supra note 2, at 36364.
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having the same binary start and finish choices to those relationships they wished
to have legally recognized.
Professor Clare Huntington has labeled the binary model of family law the
"Love-Hate Model" as a way of foregrounding the limited emotional spectrum
then recognized by family law.32 When the state acknowledged the beginning of a
legally binding relationship like marriage, it acknowledged a starting emotion of
"love." When the state permitted the legal dissolution of a marriage, it ended the
relationship with a finality that is akin to the emotion of "hate." As Huntington
demonstrated, the binary model failed to capture descriptively the reality of
spouses' remaining connections post-dissolution, especially if there were children
of the marriage. The binary model also failed normatively because it reified an
ending state (hate) that discouraged parents and children from progressing through
a more nuanced and productive cycle of emotions.33
Huntington uses a particular lens, which she calls the "Reparative Model," to
capture family law's transformation from a binary model to one that recognizes
that familial relationships follow a "dynamic cycle of intimacy." 34 Under the
Reparative Model, the particular cycle experienced by family members begins
with love, moves to hate, followed by a sense of rupture from the other, then guilt,
and finally a drive to repair the rupture. The move to a dynamic and cyclical
model of emotion created space for family law itself to embrace a wider range of
policy choices. To illustrate, in a divorce under the Love-Hate Model, a state
legislature may have articulated one of its goals as the final distribution of marital
assets. In contrast, under a Reparative Model, it might articulate its goal as
promoting the "amicable settlement of disputes," and "mitigatfing] the potential
harm to the spouses and their children" caused by the divorce. 3 6 Shifting family
law away from a binary model has productively modified the frame from the short
term of seeing the final court order as the end, to the longer term, setting up a
system that re-adjusts relationships between family members.
II. THE CHALLENGES THAT REMAIN IN THE CHANGED LANDSCAPE

As noted in the Introduction, the challenges that remain in the changed
landscape relate to translation. When it comes to the revolution away from the
adversary process, take as true that collaborative law is a robust, well-developed,
and effective alternative to it. Unfortunately, collaborative law's ability to
stimulate broad transformative change in family law depends directly on how
many families can choose to use it. Similarly, now that the revolution has
illuminated the importance of acknowledging non-binary cycles of emotions in
Huntington, supra note 2, at 1248-49.
Id. at 1247-49.
33
Id. at 1248-50.
34
Id. at 1261-72.
32

35id.
36

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-102(2)(a)-(b) (2011) (language modeled after the
Uniform Divorce and Marriage Act).
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family law, we need to understand better any differences between proposed
models of emotional cycles, as well as to operationalize concretely the goals of
those cycles.
A. The First TranslationProblem: The LimitedAccess to CollaborativeLaw

As noted earlier, the number of collaborative law practitioners has grown
exponentially since the movement was founded in 1990.37 As the website of the
International Academy of Collaborative Professionals reveals, one can now find a
collaborative lawyer in many states in the US, with some states like California,
Colorado, and New York heavily represented. Collaborative law has received
regular and positive media attention.3 9 State legislatures have acknowledged its
role. 40 Collaborative law is no longer novel in family law. While collaborative law
is now an established way in which a family law matter may be handled, there are
two features that severely limit its widespread use. First, parties engaged in
collaborative law must each hire her or his own lawyer. Second, the process itself
is expensive.
The UCLA makes clear that "[u]nder the rules/act, parties can sign a
collaborative law participation agreement only if they engage a collaborative
lawyer. Collaborative law is not an option for the self-represented."A1 The UCLA
acknowledges low-income clients only to the extent that it relaxes its attorney
disqualification rule when a collaborative lawyer is representing a low-income
client and providing collaborative services for free.42 In that situation, should the
collaborative process fail, the collaborative lawyer may end her work, but a lawyer
in her organization could pick up the pro bono representation of the low-income
client for the forthcoming litigation.4 3 The pro bono collaborative lawyer must be
screened from the continuing representation, and both parties and counsel must
have agreed in advance to the possibility of continued pro bono representation. 44
The purpose of the modified disqualification rule is to acknowledge the
challenge low-income parties face finding a lawyer at all, and the even greater

3
38

Homeyer & Amato, supra note 27, at 24.
INT'L

ACAD.

PROF'LS (Aug. 22, 2011, 6:44 PM),
http://www.collaborativepractice.com (Search completed using the "Locate a Collaborative
Professional near you" feature, searching for California, Colorado, and New York).
39 See UCLA, supra 23, at 428-34 (listing media reports).
OF

COLLABORATIVE

See CollaborativeLaw Act Summary, NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'R
LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Collaborative
%20Law%2OAct (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
41 UCLA, supra note 23, at 447 (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 452-54.
43
Id. at 454.
4 Id. at 454.
40

ON UNIF. STATE
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hardship that would attach should pro bono counsel have to withdraw.45 Further,
the UCLA drafters hoped that relaxing the disqualification rule for low-income
parties would "encourage legal aid offices, law school clinical programs and
private law firms who represent the poor through pro bono programs to
incorporate collaborative law into their practice." 4 6
However well-intentioned, the modification only helps modestly. Consider a
two-parent family with children, where both parents work in minimum wage jobs.
Should the parents decide to divorce, each would likely qualify for free legal
services. However, the local legal aid program still would only be able to represent
one of the parents, even with the relaxed disqualification rule. Traditional conflict
of interest rules prohibit the legal aid program from representing both spouses at
the start regardless of the legal aid program's ability to assign another of its
lawyers to one spouse should the collaborative process fail. 4 7 The other lowincome parent must still find pro bono counsel elsewhere.
It is not only low-income families who are challenged to afford the
collaborative law process, but also those of modest means. In general, if a person
earns income that would put her or him at an amount greater than 125% of the
federal poverty level, she or he will not qualify to receive free-legal aid.48 For an
adult with one child, the legal aid qualifying amount is about $1500 per month,
which roughly is only $300 more than would be earned by a person working 40
hours a week at the current federal minimum wage.4 9 Each party eaming more than
$1500 a month will face collaborative law costs that have been estimated to run
anywhere from $6,000 to $19,000.5o It may be the case that higher collaborative
law costs relate to more complicated cases, such as a case in which a business
must be valued. However, one study found that on average each lawyer spends
about 30 hours on a collaborative law case. 5 ' Even an average case will still

produce a bill out of reach for most people of modest means.
Second, knowing the data above, it is not surprising to learn that research has
also shown that the typical collaborative law client is "white, middle-aged, well45 Id. at 453-54 ("For most other [non low-income] parties, the disqualification
requirement imposes a hardship, but they at least have the financial resources to engage

new counsel").
46
1Id. at 454.
47
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, Conflict of Interest, Current
Clients (2010).
48 See Income Level for Individual Eligible for Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (2011),
availableat http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/2010-19449.htm.
49 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (effective 2007), which sets the current federal minimum wage
at $7.25. Thus a person working 40 hours per week at minimum wage would gross $1256
monthly ((40 x 7.25 x 52)/12).
50 See Patrick Foran, Adoption of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act in Oregon: The
Right Time and the Right Reasons, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 787, 793 (2009) (noting
studies of collaborative law cases in Boston where the average cost was $19,723, and
noting another study in which collaborative law matters cost between $6,000 to $10,000).
51 Schwab, supra note 16, at 377.
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educated and affluent." 52 In one study, 84% of the collaborative law clients had
combined household incomes greater than $100,000.53 In contrast, the average
median household income in the United States in 2008 was $52,029.54 Thus, many
people are being left out of the collaborative law process.ss
That is confirmed when one looks at data about the number of people who
appear pro se in family law courts across the country. It may be helpful first to
have a sense of what portion of a state court's docket is comprised of family law
matters. According to nationwide data collected by the National Center for State
Courts, roughly 5% of a state court's total annual caseload is comprised of
domestic relations matters. However, traffic cases comprise 54% of a court's
annual caseload, and criminal cases add another 20%. When looking at the
remaining non-traffic and non-criminal cases, domestic relations cases represent
about 21% of that caseload.57 Thus, domestic relations cases are a steady and nontrivial portion of state court dockets.
Looking at state-specific research about the volume of pro se parties in family
law cases, it is clear that it is an area in which courts see a very high number of
unrepresented parties. For example, a 2006 report from Utah found that 49% of
petitioners in family law cases were unrepresented while an astounding 81% of
respondents were unrepresented. In California, the state judicial council's Center
for Families, Children and the Courts surveyed local courts and found that 82% of
the courts reported that pro se parties most frequently appeared in family law
52

Id. at 373 (reporting findings from survey research of 367 collaborative family law

attorneys and their clients across the US); see also DiFonzo, supra note 22, at 603-06
(acknowledging that "steep financial entry cost into collaborative law" has created a barrier

in participation for those other than the wealthy).
53 Schwab, supra note 16, at 373.
54
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://edocket.

access.gpo.gov/2010/2010-19449.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
5 One might argue that collaborative law was never intended to reach all family law
participants, but only those who had resources to hire counsel. However, collaborative law
developers themselves have stated higher aspirations. See UCLA, supra note 23, at 452-54

(rule 10). Furthermore, there are mechanisms that could be used to support the use of
collaborative law more widely. For example, in the United Kingdom, where there is a
slightly more generous government-funded legal aid program, there are plans to approve
collaborative family law services as available under the legal aid program. See Press
Release, Legal Servs. Comm'n, LSC Proposes Introduction of Collaborative Law From
2010, http://www.resolution.org.uk/sitecontent-files/files/collaborative-law-consultation
26 10_09.pdf.
56 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 38 (2010),
http://www.ncsconline.org/D Research/csp/2008_files/EWSC-2008-Online%20Version
%20v2.pdf.
s7
58

Id.

COMM. ON RES. FOR SELF-REPRESENTED PARTIES, STRATEGIC PLANNING
INITIATIVE, REP. TO THE JUD. COUNCIL 5 (July 25, 2006), http://www.utcourts.gov/
resources/reports/docs/ProSeStrategic Plan-2006.pdf.
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cases. 59 The mean percentage of self-represented litigants in family law cases was
67%, although some local courts reported percentages as high as 95%.6o Similarly,
in a study focused on one county in Arizona, researchers found that the percentage
of family law cases in which at least one party was pro se had increased over a tenyear period from 24% to 90%.61
The data on the cost of collaborative law and on the number of pro se parties
appearing in family courts across the county make clear that no matter how
transformative collaborative law has been for those participants who have been
able to use it, the scope of transformation is severely limited. Thus, as the family
law revolution attempts to find a satisfying ending, it must acknowledge that
family courts remain a critical locus for reform efforts. The challenge is to
determine how the important lessons produced by collaborative law can be
translated for use in a busy court system with many unrepresented parties.
As we look to meet that challenge, pragmatism is imperative. Proposals for
reform must attend to important considerations that flow from the data showing
high levels of pro se participation in family courts. First, and most directly,
reforms need to be understandable and accessible to people without need for
expert guidance or translation by a lawyer. None of the existing data suggests that
the numbers of pro se parties in family courts will decline. No data suggests that
there will be an increase in the number of lawyers available to low or modest
income people. Reforms will only assist family courts if they do not increase the
need for some kind of expert help, legal or otherwise.
Second, reforms need to be low cost and should not increase in a burdensome
way the current expenses of a family law case. Parties who do not have money to
hire lawyers or experts also do not likely have money to pay for additional courtmandated processes.
Finally, reforms need to increase the likelihood that parties will not return to
court contentiously after the court enters its final order in the original family law
matter. As noted above, family courts already have a steady and full docket with
original filings in family cases.62 Courts do not need to expand their dockets with
post-decree matters-those cases in which a parent or spouse returns to court
seeking to reconsider issues already once resolved in the initial case. As
collaborative law has demonstrated, a family is better served by reforms that
develop the participants' abilities to solve jointly any challenges that arise in the
future. A family court will be similarly benefitted if it can find and support
processes that build problem-solving skills in its pro se participants. For example,
59 JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, A REPORT
AND ANALYSIS OF ACTION PLANS THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA: INTEGRATING SERVICES FOR
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS INTO THE COURT SYSTEM 6 (2003), http://www.courtinfo.

ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/SJIReport.
pdf.
60
Id. at 8.
61 Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative
to Attorney
Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. Louis UNIv. L.J. 553, 594 (1993) (looking at an
increase in unrepresented parties in Maricopa County from the period of 1980-90).
62 See supra note 56.
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if after the court's initial order, one of the parties needs to relocate for a job that
will require her to reconfigure parenting time, it benefits a family court if the
parties do not need to litigate to a solution, but are able to create a new stipulated
parenting plan that they jointly present to the court for its approval.
B. The Second Translation Problem:
How to PragmaticallyAcknowledge Cycles ofEmotions

Turning now to the second translation challenge of how*family law can
acknowledge an emotional cycle more complicated and dynamic than "LoveHate." Scholars have theorized about several alternative cycles, two of which are
forgiveness63 and reparation. 4 That work was critical in pushing family law to
recognize emotional cycles that existed beyond the confines of a family court
proceeding. However, if one takes seriously the existing needs of family courts to
work with modestly-resourced pro se parties, then theorized alternative cycles
must be made concrete. That has not happened.
Consider first the proposal that family law should encourage participants to
work towards an emotional end state of forgiveness. The idea that forgiveness is
an appropriate goal on which a court should focus owes its heritage largely to the
Restorative Justice Movement and its work in criminal law settings between crime
victims and offenders.6 5 In the family law setting, Professor Solangel Maldonado
has been an eloquent advocate for the role of forgiveness. 66 Professor Maldonado
argues that family law cases, like divorce, generally trigger in the parties negative
emotions like anger, betrayal, guilt, and vengeance. 67 Those negative emotions in
turn trigger unhelpful or damaging behaviors that may range from extreme actions
like destroying property or abandoning children to more mundane, but still
harmful, actions like arguing in front of children about parenting time.68
Maldonado offers forgiveness as a way of helping spouses, partners, parents and
children to move from an emotional state filled with negative and unproductive
emotions to a more positive and productive emotional state.69 Parents, spouses,
partners and children are then able to translate that positive and productive
emotional state into positive and productive behaviors towards each other and for
themselves.

See generally Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility
and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 441 (2008).
63

Huntington, supra note 2, at 1247, 1260.
See generally 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (2000) (entire volume focused on restorative
justice in criminal law settings).
66 See Maldonado, supra note 63; see also Solangel Maldonado, Taking
Account of
6
65

Children's Emotions: Anger and Forgiveness in "RenegotiatedFamilies," 16 VIR. J. OF

&L. 443 (2009).
Maldonado, supra note 63, at 448-49.
6
1Id. at 449-60.
69
Id. at 479-82.
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Inspired by work in psychology and philosophy, Maldonado frames
forgiveness as a willing act in which a person voluntarily forgoes negative
emotions like vengeance, resentment and bitterness towards a wrongdoer. 7 0
Instead, a person cultivates understanding and compassion toward a wrongdoer
without excusing the wrongdoer's bad conduct.7' The appeal to Maldonado is that
forgiveness should lead to "the reduction of anger." 72
Maldonado is further encouraged by research suggesting that forgiveness is
teachable, and not just an idealistic, but unobtainable, emotional state. 7 3 As one
forgiveness researcher has put it, "[f]orgiveness is a trainable skill just like
learning to throw a baseball." 74 Maldonado points to three different teaching
models, each of which has resulted in some empirical data that the models'
creators offer as support for the efficacy of their respective teaching model. 7
Interestingly, one way that forgiveness is measured empirically is to assess
whether a person is exhibiting other useful emotional end goals, such as feeling
less stress, and not relying on anger as a response. 6 For example, the empirical
study of the Stanford Forgiveness Project (one of the training models noted by
Maldonado) included pre- and post-training measures on a "forgiveness scale" that
asked about feelings related to negative emotions like hatred and revenge, and
positive emotions like feeling at peace or feeling compassion.77 The study also
included measures on a "perceived stress scale," and a scale designed to measure
angry feelings over time ("trait anger").78 The empirical studies help illuminate the
primary challenge of forgiveness-the question of whether there is a sufficiently
standardized meaning of "forgiveness" and a sufficiently standardized notion of
what forgiveness looks like in terms of conduct or emotional states.
Very practically, researchers acknowledge that there is not a "gold standard"
definition of forgiveness. 7 9 Further, researchers acknowledge that their definitions
of "forgiveness" may be inconsistent with, or more nuanced than, the ordinary
understanding of the term.80 An average person often conceives of "forgiveness"
Id. at 479.
71 Id. at 480.
72
Id. at 479-81.
70

7

Id. at 485-86.

74 FRED LUSKIN, FORGIVE FOR GOOD:

A

PROVEN PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTH AND

vii (2002).
7 Maldonado, supra,note 63, at 487-89.
76 See, e.g., Alex H. S. Harris, Frederic Luskin, Sonya B. Norman, Sam Standard,
Jennifer Bruning, Stephanie Evans & Carl E. Thoresen, Effects of a Group Forgiveness
Intervention on Forgiveness, PerceivedStress, and Trait-Anger, 62 J. OF CLINICAL PsYCH.
HAPPINESS

715 (2006).
77
d. at 719-20.
7
1 d. at 720.
7 Id. at 716; See also ROBERT D. ENRIGHT & RICHARD P. FITZGIBBONS, HELPING
CLIENTS FORGIVE: AN EMPIRICAL GUIDE FOR RESOLVING ANGER AND RESTORING HOPE

(2000) (in which the authors use over forty pages of their book to define forgiveness).
80 id; see also Frank D. Fincham, Forgiveness:Integral to Close Relationships and
Inimical to Justice?, 16 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 357, 371 (2009) (noting that for crime
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as requiring her to excuse the bad behavior of the person or to reconcile with him
or her.8 ' For people going through a divorce, the suggestion that a court will
require them to forgive each other will likely strike them, at best, as premature,
and, at worst, as offensive and inappropriate.
Further, it is not only lay people who may balk at forgiveness. While writing
this Article, I queried some family law judges about whether they thought a family
court should have the goal of helping parties to forgive each other. The uniform
response was an unhesitating chortle of incredulity. In other words, family law
judges are as likely to employ ordinary meanings of forgiveness (rather than
research definitions) as are the people appearing in front of them. Forgiveness,
then, as a family court's choice of end goal for the emotional developmental cycle,
is a non-starter, even if only as a strategic choice about labeling.
If we were able to move beyond the definitional and labeling challenges of
using the term "forgiveness," we still would need to consider whether the
ambitious goal of fostering forgiveness is appropriate for a family court. Research
showing the positive physical and mental health benefits of forgiveness, 82 suggests
that a court should support the parties' mutually agreed upon efforts towards
achieving forgiveness. If the parties have decided to try to forgive each other, or
try on behalf of their children, then the appropriate role of the court is to support
those ambitions. For example, the court can applaud the parties' efforts in remarks
in open court. Or a court can make sure that in documents like a parenting plan
that the parties detail (possibly with the court's help) their specific plans for
working towards forgiveness, such as the specific training that the parties and their
children will attend, and how the parties will pay for the training.
On the other hand, the ambitiousness of forgiveness also makes it
unreasonably challenging as a mandated goal for a family court. While research
has shown that forgiveness is a teachable skill," it has not shown, and likely could
not show, any certainty as to the percentage of adults or children that learn
forgiveness and to what extent. Further, forgiveness research has focused on
guided interventions-meaning that the training is lead by an expert teacher.84 We
do not have information that helps us understand under what conditions
forgiveness can be learned effectively on one's own through self-help materials or

victims the word "forgiveness" can be a "lightning rod" because a victim may presume it
means to excuse a crime).
81 MICHELE LOWRANCE,

THE GOOD KARMA DIVORCE: AVOID LITIGATION, TURN

NEGATIVE EMOTIONS INTO POSITIVE ACTIONS, AND GET ON WITH THE REST OF YOUR LIFE

120-21 (2010).
82 Maldonado, supra note 63, 479-82; see also LUSKIN, supra
note 64, at ch. 7.
83 See Maldonado, supra note 63, at 485-86; see also LUSKIN,
supra note 64, at ch. 9.
84 See, e.g., Thomas W. Baskin & Robert D. Enright, Intervention
Studies on
Forgiveness:A Meta-Analysis, 82 J. OF COUNSELING & DEV. 79 (2004) (reviewing existing
empirical studies on forgiveness intervention trainings).
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the like.85 Thus, a choice to affirmatively engage family courts in moving people
towards forgiveness means that the court system will have to put itself into the
business of guided forgiveness training.
Advocates of forgiveness rightly point out that many family courts have
already moved to mandating parenting classes for all divorcing parents.8 6 Those
courses are usually two to four hours long, often in one session. Thus, courts
have some experience in how to build out a court-annexed training program.
Forgiveness advocates can assert that building out forgiveness training is just
another step in that already-familiar process. However, both the benefit and the
challenge is that almost all of the existing models of forgiveness training are
substantially longer and more intensive than a parenting class. While one
forgiveness model involves a 1-hour letter writing session, most models include
multi-week training sessions (from four to twelve weeks), and at least one study
included weekly counseling sessions of up to fourteen months.88
With increased intensity and frequency comes increased cost. For a family
court trying to keep down costs to the parties of divorce proceedings, mandating a
multi-week forgiveness training program for parents and children is too much of a
financial burden. In the end, forgiveness as an end state of a developmental cycle
of emotions may be attractive when considering the court's practical goal of
getting parties to jointly problem-solve, but is impractical when considering the
court's goals of making sure that the process is definitionally understandable and
accessible to lay parties, as well as to the court personnel with whom they interact.
Another possible goal for a family court is to encourage parties towards an
emotional state of reparation. As noted earlier, that is the goal suggested by

Professor Huntington in her critique of the "Love-Hate Model." 89 Huntington
draws on the work of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, in which Klein posits that each
of us is innately driven to repair the harm we inflict upon another with whom we
share intimacy. 90 Huntington positions reparation as something other than
forgiveness, 9 1 as well as something other than "simply a kiss-and-make-up idea
...
Instead, reparation is a way to acknowledge dynamism in emotions, and to
allow for an emotional developmental state beyond hate or anger. 93 Reparation as a
There are self-help materials designed to teach forgiveness created by experts in the
field of forgiveness interventions. See LUSKIN, supra note 74. But I am not aware of any
empirical studies looking at whether any self-help materials effectively teach forgiveness.
86 Maldonado, supra note 63,
at 475-76.
87 Id. at 475; see also YWCA OF BOULDER COUNTY, CO-PARENTING
FOR LIFE
CLASSES, http://www.ywcaboulder.org/programs/coparenting.html (last visited Oct. 13,
2011) (includes a brief description of the court-approved three-hour parenting class for
divorcing parents living in Boulder County, Colorado).
88 Baskin & Enright, supra note 82, at 80-84.
8 Huntington, supra note 2, at 1294-1302.
"o1d. at 1260-64.
91
d. at 1300.
92
Id. at 1295.
" Id. at 1297-98.
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goal requires parties, and a family court, to address and accommodate the fact that
familial relationships continue in some fashion after a rupture like divorce.9 4
The specific attractiveness of reparation as a developmental goal is its
signaling function as identified by Huntington. It tells the parties that something in
the family constellation has to be put back together: that while a divorce may
initially splinter parents from each other, children from their parents, and possibly
children from each other, the court will work to put some splintered pieces back
together. But, under Huntington's conception, reparation does not signal to the
parties that all splintered pieces must be put back together nor that all negative
emotions need be resolved. In that regard, it is a less ambitious goal than
forgiveness.
Nonetheless, the challenge of reparation is similar to that of forgiveness-to a
lay person it may too quickly and firmly trigger notions of reconciliation and
unity. Thus, a court might risk provoking unnecessary anxiety and disbelief if it
tells parties that they will be expected to repair their relationship with each other
and with their children. In a very. practical way, a court might find the goal of
repair more destructive than constructive.
Further, while it was not Huntington's task to operationalize reparation fully,
a family court adopting reparation as a developmental goal would need to
articulate its criteria as well as be able to instruct parties in what steps to take to
achieve reparation. Huntington sees the seeds of reparation in some "partial
reforms" already taking place in family law.95 For example, the use of mediation in
family law cases, court-ordered parenting classes and court-approved parenting
coordinator programs.9 6 Each of those reforms seeks to engage parents in
particular in learning how to communicate with each other productively about their
ongoing relationship as co-parents.9 7 As a practical matter, it is unclear whether
reparation means more than that. Is repair something in addition to a baseline
ability to communicate? Could repair have occurred between parents who are able
to exchange information between themselves about their children, but who still do
so with venom in their voices? It is the operationalizing of repair that makes it a
difficult goal for family courts.
As the above discussions about forgiveness and reparation help illuminate, it
is difficult to move from acknowledging a cycle of emotions and selecting an end
emotional goal to translating that transformative process to a court system that has
limited resources and many pro se participants. That difficulty, however, helps
uncover another possibility. Instead of focusing on an end emotional state of a
cycle of emotions, might it be more productive to consider whether there is a mode
of thinking or of processing emotional information or responses that would be
helpful to family courts and their participants? My answer is yes, and I offer a
mode of thinking that I call equipoise.
94 Id.

at
9 Id. at
96 Id.
at
1 Id. at

1298-99.
1287.
1288-90.
1288-90.
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III. EQUIPOISE AS A MODE OF RESPONSE
By equipoise, I mean to suggest a kind of emotional equilibrium" as well as a
sense of non-attachment to any particular emotion that threatens to take hold of a
person at any particular time. It is not a "letting go" of emotions. Rather, it is

clearly identifying and acknowledging the presence of particular emotions, but
distancing oneself from the knee-jerk reaction that a particular emotion often

triggers (i.e., noticing that one is angry at the remark just made by one's exspouse, but not reflexively reacting with a hostile retort). Equipoise allows a
person a moment of self-reflection immediately after one notices she or he is
feeling an emotion (either negative or positive). In that moment of self-reflection,

a person has the opportunity to quickly recall the patterned response that the
emotion usually triggers in her or him, to identify another possible response, and to
choose between the two. It might go something like this:
Father: "Why didn't you pack Janie's medication for me and have it

ready when I'm here to pick her up for the weekend?"
Mother, to herself: "Ugh, there he goes again, always blaming me. I just
want to drop Janie's bag on the ground right here and turn around and go
back in the house."
"Okay, I know his remark has made me angry. I can either drop the bag
and then be angry myself all weekend, or I can try something else. I

think I'm feeling strong enough to try something else."
Mother to Father: "How about we talk to Janie's doctor and see if she'll
write another prescription for us that you can have. That way, you'll
have Janie's medicine at your house, too, and neither of us will have to
worry about getting it back and forth between our houses."99
Most of us are likely able to recall a situation of our own that would be equivalent
to the one above. We know that the entire sequence of thinking might take no
more than a handful of seconds once the mother has learned how to notice
emotional triggers. Equipoise can be very quick and effective.
The equilibrium contemplated by equipoise is an end state, but not necessarily
a constant state. In the example above, the mother clearly feels angry, but through

9

The Oxford English Dictionary defines equipoise as "equality or equal distribution

of weight; a condition of perfect balance or equilibrium."

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

(2d ed. 1989).
99 In this vignette, I am not suggesting that the mother's solution is the best or the one
that is most likely to work-only that the vignette demonstrates a move away from an
habituated emotional response.
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an intentional effort to be aware of how emotional states get triggered in her, the
mother is not captured by her anger. She can see what is happening, identify some
options about how to respond, and thereby, disengage herself from the emotion
and move to a state of equipoise. But, five minutes later when she is driving home
and someone cuts in front of her, she may again feel anger rise, moving her out of
equipoise. The developmental goal of equipoise assuredly is to cultivate a capacity
to maintain equipoise for greater periods of time, but the practice of equipoise is
grounded in our everyday experiences of rising and falling emotions, both positive
and negative.
Those who have spent time in family court and heard a judge say to parties
that they need to work on reducing conflict between them may question whether
equipoise is just a fancy name for conflict reduction or anger management. It is
not, but in some situations equipoise may very well include outcomes that would
be similar to those resulting from conflict reduction or anger management. The
differences lie in scope and focus. For a person striving for equipoise, the first step
is to effectively recognize and identify that one is in a situation which has
prompted a particular emotional response-fear, hurt, happiness, love-and then
confirm the response one would show before showing it. A person could still
decide that the appropriate response is anger or confrontation, but at a measured,
not uncontrolled, level.
There are three primary benefits to family members of equipoise as a mode of
responding. First, equipoise readily acknowledges that a person may feel very
negative emotions (or very positive emotions) towards another family member. It
validates the fact of emotions as well as the range of emotions. Second, equipoise
sets two immediate goals-self-awareness of emotional responses and selfreflection about options for responses. While the goals may be very challenging
(i.e., it can be hard to self-reflect when one's immediate impulse is to yell), they
are immediate goals that do not depend on a person feeling benevolent towards the
other family member.
For example, a spouse need not have committed to forgiving the other spouse
in order to practice successfully the steps leading to equipoise. Nonetheless, a
secondary benefit of equipoise is that it may set the groundwork for a person to
move to a more challenging long-term emotional development goal like
forgiveness. As a person becomes more skilled in identifying and reflecting, and,
thus, retains equipoise for greater periods of time, she may be more amenable to
goals such as forgiveness.
The third primary benefit of equipoise is that it is a self-directed enterprise.
Any person can work on equipoise without waiting for, or needing the
participation of, other family members. Thus, even if one or more family members
is attached to a Love-Hate Model, other family members can still move beyond
that and opt to respond using emotional equipoise.ioo

1oo This benefit is not unique to equipoise. Other emotional developmental goals like
forgiveness share that feature.
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The remaining questions for equipoise are the three practical ones identified
earlier. Would equipoise decrease the chances of parties returning to court to argue
about post-decree issues? Would court-encouraged efforts towards equipoise be
financially manageable for parties? And, is the practice of equipoise one that
parties can understand and make progress towards without the use of, or need for,
lawyers? It is those three practical questions that I turn to in the next section.
IV. THE PRACTICALITIES OF EQUIPOISE

In order to answer the three practical questions, it is necessary to describe
further how one "does" equipoise. As I have depicted equipoise, at its core it is a
set of mental habits one tries to learn and solidify. There is not one way, or a right
way, to learn equipoise, and we find hints of it already in the ways in which family
courts have begun to transform themselves away from the Love-Hate Model.
For example, I have observed family court judges talking with parties at their
first court hearing about the parties' need to understand that their relationship is
changing, but not ending, and that the parties should think about each other more
as if they had a business relationship. With a business relationship, the court
advises the parties' obligations to each other are limited to effective and efficient
communications about very specific topics, like their children, and nothing
further.' 0 Implicit in the judges' remarks is the idea that such a "business"
relationship does not have the same emotional volatility as does a personal
relationship, and that emotional equilibrium would be useful to the parties.102
The judges' remarks are cursory and do not give the parties any guidance on
how it is that they are to transform their relationship, nor what it is about a
business relationship in particular that they should try and emulate. But, the
judges' interest in, and willingness to try, some kind of colloquy with the parties
about the importance of changing the emotional valence of their interactions sets
the stage for a more thorough colloquy introducing the components of equipoise.
Another example is parents who use a notebook to exchange information with
each other about their children. 0 3 Each parent writes down the information that
she or he needs to communicate about the child (i.e., "Sarah has a cold and I've
been giving her children's aspirin. Her last dose was at 3pm.") Using a notebook
mirrors important facets of equipoise. First, it takes more time to write down what
one intends to say rather than to just say it. That extra time creates an opportunity
101The idea that former spouses should understand themselves as business partners is
also one recommended by mental health experts who work with divorcing parents. Robert
Emery describes it this way: "All that keeps you and your ex involved now is your joint
enterprise: your children. They are your 'business,' and you two are 'business partners."'
EMERY, supra note 2, at 51.
102 I am not arguing here that it is descriptively true that business relationships never
have emotional volatility, but only that it resonates for most people that intimate
relationships can be more emotional than business relationships.
103 This technique is generally used only with children who have not yet learned how
to read.
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for the writer to become aware of any emotional response she or he is having.
Next, the fact that one can rip out a page of the notebook and start again creates
the possibility of reflecting on the emotional tenor of one's response and then
deciding to alter it. The use of a notebook in no way guarantees equipoise-if a
parent wishes to write intemperately, the parent can follow through on that
impulse. The point is that the notebook technique lends itself to a practice of
equipoise and makes that practice more apparent to parents.
In my experience, when someone, usually a mediator or one of the lawyers,
suggests to parents that they use a notebook, the technique is often introduced as a
way for the parents to avoid getting angry with each other. The conversation is
fairly brief and does not break out for the parents the way in which writing may
help them identify emotions and reflect on responses, or the possibility of starting
over by ripping out a page of the notebook upon reflection. Yet, it would not be
hard to expand the notebook conversation.
A final example is court-annexed parenting classes. Such classes are
increasingly a part of the divorce process, with a recent study reporting that at least
forty-six states mandate such classes.1 04 Researchers have categorized classes
along a dimension labeled "levels of family involvement," identifying three levels
of parenting classes."o" Level one classes focus on providing parents with basic
"research information" about issues such as how their relationship to each other
will change because of divorce, the ways children often react to divorce, and
techniques for effectively communicating with each other and with children.0 6
Level one classes might include video vignettes of parents and children
interacting, with the class then discussing how parents might best respond, or
experts from the video giving suggestions on how to respond.10 7 Level one classes
are usually one session lasting a few hours.08
Level two and three classes include the same kind of information as level one
classes, but go beyond didactic learning and are often longer than one session. 09
Level two classes focus on teaching and practicing "cooperative parenting skills"
with the goal that parents who practice those skills in a calm setting can then
transfer those skills to "emotionally charged settings.""t0 For example, in one level
two class, parents watch video vignettes of divorcing parents interacting with each
other, then discuss what they saw, including particulars like the specific word
choices that parents made, offer alternative options, and then practice similar
104

Barbara A. Babb, Gloria Danziger, Judith D. Moran & Itta Englander, Parent

Education Programs: Review of the Literature and Annotated Bibliography, UNIV,
BALT. SCH.
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http://law.ubalt.edu/

downloads/law downloads/June2009_ParentEdPrograms-FINAL.pdf.
'o' Karen R. Blaisure & Margie J. Gleasler, The Divorce Education Intervention
Model, 38 FAMILY & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 501, 501-02 (2000).
106 Id. at 507.
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conversations themselves."' Level three classes are similar in content to level two
but presume that participants will need more intensive direction and assistance in
becoming competent at the skills being taught.' 12
In each kind of parenting class described above, at least part of what parents
are being introduced to is the idea that they have choices that they can make about
how they respond to the other parent or to their child. Parents are introduced,
either implicitly or explicitly, to the skills of identifying emotional responses to
communication and reflecting on the choices they have about how to respond. In
level two and three classes, parents essentially simulate the steps for a practice of
equipoise-they deconstruct an interaction, first identifying what words triggered
what kinds of emotions, then identifying what response could be used to alter the
emotional tenor. In practice, however, the parents do not actually have to press
themselves to reach equipoise, but the idea is that when they are next in an
emotionally charged setting with their co-parent, the simulated experience will
spark a process of self-reflection and intentional choice about how they choose to
respond.
While the above examples all contain the preliminaries for a practice of
equipoise, there are other common activities available to parents and children that
more explicitly include equipoise. One example is yoga.13 In most forms of yoga,
the practice of equipoise flows from exercises related to breathing.'' 4 By learning
techniques for focusing on the breath, yoga practitioners train themselves to more
specifically attend to their immediate surroundings and to the things that they are
sensing presently, both physical and mental."i5 Both in breathing practices and
posing practices, yoga instruction usually includes reminders to notice sensations
or thoughts, but not to judge them. The idea is that just being aware of one's
physical and mental processes allows one to have some remove from the
habituated response one ordinarily would have. For example, noticing that my
back hurts in a yoga pose and not immediately judging that sensation as harmful
allows me space to decide whether I should respond in accord with my habit and
squirm or instead remain in the pose because I realize the pain is more discomfort

than a sign of harm or injury.
Yoga classes are now ubiquitous in most cities and towns across America.
For example, if one looks at the schedule of classes for YMCA branches across the

..Id. at 509.
.112

i

'i
When I talk about yoga in this Article, I am referring to it in its typical form in
America. For a helpful discussion of the differences between yoga in America and its more
originalist Hindu form, see Wade Dazey, Yoga in America: Some Reflections from the
Heartland, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF YOGA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GERALD JAMES
LARSON (Knut Kacobsen, ed., Koninklijke Brill, 2005).
" Richard C. Miller, Working with the Breath, in LIVING YOGA: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE FOR DAILY LIFE 27-38 (Georg Feurstein & Stephanie Bodian eds., 1993).
" Stephan Bodian, The Buddhist Yoga of Mindfulness: An Interview with S.N.
Goenka, in LIVING YOGA, supra note 114, at 138-40.
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country, one generally will find some kind of yoga class offered.' 16 There are also
yoga classes designed specifically for children, although it may be more common
to find such classes at private yoga studios than at a YMCA.' 17
There are other sports in which mental equanimity is an important part. For
example, many martial arts include training for finding and maintaining a calm
mind. In Tae Kwon Do, an art form originally developed in Korea, one
grandmaster described the ultimate state of mind that students strive to achieve as
being "at peace with themselves and the world around them, regardless of the
setting,"" 8 which allows a person not to "be upset by anything they encounter in
life.""19 The specific techniques of Tae Kwon Do often have a core component
related to "focus." As described by Grandmaster Yeon Hwan Park, "[fjocus is the
ability to channel all of the power in your body to a specific point in space....
Focus is developed through a combination of precisely controlled movement and
relaxation." 20 Tae Kwon Do, like most martial arts, embraces all ages of students
from young children to older adults.121
Furthermore, many other kinds of sports might be coached or taught in a way
in which a component of instruction considers mental processes that relate to focus
and awareness of emotions. For example, a soccer coach might include mental
exercises that help a player respond calmly in a tense moment like a penalty kick.
If a parent were aware of the benefits of emotional equipoise, then a parent could
look for that facet when comparing sports or activities and selecting the one that
might help her or her children not only physically, but emotionally as well.
Finally, there are practices that directly focus on emotional equipoise, the
primary example of which is meditation. Meditation may be the practice least
familiar to courts, parents and children. However, burgeoning research suggests
that meditation is, in fact, highly effective at training a person in emotional
116

1 randomly selected YMCA branches across the country and found the following

yoga classes offered: YMCA of Athens, GA: http://www.athens ymca.org/fitness.shtml;
YMCA of Billings, MT: http://www.billingsymca.org/; YMCA of Greater Des Moines
(Riverfront location); http://www.dmymca.org/ support/upload/schedule 292.pdf; YMCA
of Ithaca & Tompkins County: http://www.ithacaymca.com/schedules/fitness/Fall 10
Session1_Group_&_Specialty Descriptions.pdf; YMCA of Superior California
(Sacramento): http://sacymca.org/pdf /Schedule oct09.pdf; YMCA of Central New
Mexico: http://www.ymcacnm.org/ programs/health-fitness.php?program id=4.
117 I reach that conclusion fairly unscientifically by comparing the number of entries
produced by a Google search of "kids yoga class" compared with "YMCA kids yoga
class." For examples of kid's yoga classes at private studios, see http://www.karmakids
yoga.coml/, and http://www.happyyoga4kids.com/. For examples of YMCA kid's yoga
classes, see http://www.wikichild.com/ Ohio/Columbus/All/Fitness/Static.aspx, and
http://www.ymcainfo.org/family/ youth.html.
'" YEON HWAN PARK AND JON GERRARD, BLACK BELT TAE KwoN Do: THE
ULTIMATE REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S MOST POPULAR BLACK BELT MARTIAL
ART 6 (2000).

"' Id.

120 Id. at 22.
121 Id. at 236-37.

86

JOURNAL OF LAW

& FAMILY STUDIES

[VOL. 14

equipoise. Neuroimaging studies have been one of the ways researchers have
captured the effects of meditation on the brain.' 2 2 In one review, researchers noted
that subjects who learned a type of mediation called "mindfulness" meditation
showed greater activity levels in parts of the brain associated with the ability to
recognize the emotional tone of an experience and parts associated with regulating
emotional responses.123 Similarly, in a study comparing experienced meditators
with novice ones, brain imaging showed that experienced meditators responded to
distracting sounds with parts of the brain related to response inhibition and
attention, while novice meditators did not, leading researchers to conclude that
meditation improves a person's capacity to remain unperturbed. 2 4 Finally, another
neuroimaging study found that experienced and novice meditators who practiced
meditation designed to foreground empathy and compassion showed greater brain
activity in empathy centers of the brain.1 25
There are numerous meditation practices, often with different entry points.
For example, one entry point may be healthful living or pain reduction.12 6 Another
For an overview of numerous neurological studies on animals and humans relating
to the ways in which mental processes can tangibly affect the brain, see SHARON BEGLEY,
TRAIN YOUR MIND, CHANGE YOUR BRAIN: HOW A NEw SCIENCE REVEALS OUR
EXTRAORDINARY POTENTIAL TO TRANSFORM OURSELVES (2007). See also Sindya N.
Bhanoo, How Meditation May Change the Brain, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:29AM)
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/how-meditation-may-change-the-brain/.
123 Antoine Lutz, Heleen A Slagter, John D. Dunne & Richard J. Davidson, Attention
Regulation and Monitoring in Meditation, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 163 (2008); see
also Britta K. Holsel, James Carmody, Mark Vangel, Christina Congelton, Sita M.
122

Yeramsetti, Tim Gard, Sara W. Lazar, Mindfulness PracticeLeads to Increases in Regional

Brain Gray Matter Density, 191 PSYCHIATRY RES.: NEUROIMAGING 36 (2011) (longterm
practitioners of "mindfulness-based stress reduction" meditation showed increased gray
matter in areas of the brain related to emotion control).
124 J.A. Brefczynski-Lewis, A. Lutz, H.S. Schaefer, D.B. Levinson & R.J. Davidson,
Neural Correlates of Attentional Expertise in Long-Term Meditation Practitioners, 104
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SC. 11483 (2007). For a brief review of other
studies finding beneficial wellness consequences of meditation, see also Heleen A. Slagter,
Antoine Lutz, Lawrence L. Greischar, Andrew D. Francis, Sander Nieuwenhuis, James M.
Davis, Richard J. Davidson, Mental Training Affects Distribution of Limited Brain
Resources, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY E138 (June 2007), available at http://www.plosbiology.org
/article/info% 3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0050138; Peter H. Huang, Authentic
Happiness, Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 755, 775-76
(2008).
25 Antoine Lutz, Julie Brefczynski-Lewis, Tom Johnstone, Richard J. Davidson,
Regulation of the Neural Circuitry of Emotion by Compassion Meditation: Effects of
Meditative Expertise, 3 PLOS ONE E897 (2008), available at http://www.plosone.org/
article/info%3Adoi%2Fl0.1371 %2Fjoumal.pone.0001 897.
126

Jon Kabat-Zinn is one of the best known authors who writes about health, pain or
KABAT-ZINN, FULL CATASTROPHE

stress as entry points for a meditation practice. See JON

LIVING: USING THE WISDOM OF YOUR BODY AND MIND TO FACE STRESS, PAIN AND
ILLNESS (1990); JON KABAT-ZINN, THE MINDFUL WAY THROUGH DEPRESSION: FREEING
YOURSELF FROM CHRONIC DEPRESSION (2007).
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may be stress reduction.127 Yet another might be a spiritual focus.1 2 8 Finally, there
are meditation practices targeted at children. 12 9 Regardless of the entry point, the
actual techniques of meditation practices train a person to identify mental
processes, including physical sensations or emotional responses, to resist an
impulsive response to a mental process, and to cultivate an ability to hold
equanimity when reflecting on, and choosing, a response.130
Turning now to practicalities, the first question is whether or not equipoise is
a goal that courts can explain to lay people and help them look for opportunities to
develop that competency without the need for a lawyer. Just like the labels of
"forgiveness" and "reparation" presented some preliminary challenges, so does
equipoise. On the most basic level, equipoise is not a legal concept, and also not a
word commonly used. Contrast that with forgiveness, where it may be possible for
a court to say to parties that it would facilitate and encourage the parties to reach
forgiveness, knowing that the parties would have some instant (even if unhelpful)
sense of "forgiveness."
But, the benefit of equipoise being a less familiar term is that it is also less
freighted with unhelpful meanings. As we have seen, family courts already have
started to describe some of the precursors of equipoise by describing to parties that
their relationship is not ending, but instead is changing from a personal, intimate
one to a business one. Courts could build on that dialogue to introduce more fully
the contours of equipoise, whether or not the word "equipoise" is ever used. For
example, a court might offer one goal of a business relationship as the efficient
exchange of information about a shared interest, and suggest that efficiency is
increased when both business partners pay attention to the ways in which they add
emotional content to their descriptions.
Importantly, there is nothing about the way in which I have described the
practice of equipoise that could not be understood by a lay person. A court would
not need additional assistance from a lawyer to make sure that spouses, parents or
children functionally understand the developmental goal of equipoise. Of course,
understanding the goal of equipoise and practicing equipoise are two different
127

See, e.g., Meditation: Take A Stress Break Wherever You Are,

MAYO CLINIC,

http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/meditation/HQ01070 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
128 For example, meditation is a notable component of Buddhism. See
generally
Deborah J. Cantrell, Can CompassionatePractice Also Be Good Legal Practice:Lessons

from the Lives ofBuddhist Lawyers 12 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 3, 34 (2010).
129

See

generally

LINDA

LANTIERI,

BUILDING

EMOTIONAL

INTELLIGENCE:

TECHNIQUES TO CULTIVATE INNER STRENGTH IN CHILDREN (2008); DAVID FONTANA AND
INGRID SLACK, TEACHING MEDITATION TO CHILDREN: THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE
AND BENEFITS OF MEDITATION TECHNIQUES (2007); LISA DESMOND, BABY BUDDHA: A
GUIDE FOR TEACHING MEDITATION TO CHILDREN (2004).
130 For descriptions of meditative practices and goals from several traditions,
compare, NYANAPONIKA THERA, THE HEART OF BUDDHIST MEDITATION 64-84 (1965)
(describing Vipassana meditation); SEUNG SAIN, THE COMPASS OF ZEN 268-70 (1997)
(describing Zen meditation); SANGHARAKSHITA, A GUIDE TO THE BUDDHIST PATH (1990)
(describing meditation in a pan-Buddhist approach).
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things. While the court may be able to place the goal of equipoise on a family's
agenda, the family may still need additional help identifying activities or practices
that will help its members develop equipoise. Fortunately, a family proceeding pro
se can find information and assistance on that topic from sources other than
lawyers. Further, a family court might develop a list of resources related to
equipoise that it could make available to pro se parties through a court's pro se
assistance program.
Next, consider whether it is financially reasonable for courts to expect
spouses, parents, and children to pursue a developmental goal of equipoise. As we
have seen, already there are court-imposed costs in family court that relate to
programs designed to help families in transition. Those costs can include parenting
classes,132 and possibly mediation costs in those jurisdictions requiring it., For
spouses or parents grappling with the change to, and challenge of, covering the
expenses of two households instead of one, every new cost matters. Thus, it would
be particularly useful if training on equipoise could be incorporated into existing
parenting classes or mediation requirements.
As noted in the discussion above, even the most basic level one parenting
classes often contain the seeds of a practice in equipoise. Courts adopting a
developmental goal of equipoise could require parenting class providers to more
fully develop components related to equipoise. It is likely that providers would be
able to respond using modest effort, and the modifications need not change the
existing costs of the parenting class. For example, take the basic level one course
where participants view a video vignette of a parent interaction. In the discussion,
the parenting class instructor could help participants identify what kinds of
emotions they would have felt had they been in the conversation, then practice
delaying their responses until they have identified the emotion, ending with
brainstorming about alternative ways to respond and predictions about whether the
outcome of the conversation would change. The parenting class instructor could
conclude by having the class break into small groups to do short role plays to try
out techniques.
Finally, parenting class providers might be required to provide all of their
participants with a list of local activities or resources that they might use to further
their training in equipoise. The list could include very low cost options such as
self-help materials available at the local library that introduce practices of
If a family court were to develop a list of equipoise-related resources, then an
ancillary benefit is that the court could provide that list to all parties. Even well-resourced
parties may prefer to choose options that are less expensive.
132 See, e.g., Co-Parentingfor Life Classes, YWCABOULDER.ORG, http://www.ywca
boulder.org/?page id=222 (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).
1

1 See, e.g., Revised Fee Schedule for Alternative Dispute Resolution Services
Provided by the Office of Dispute Resolution, COLO. STATE JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Executive/ODR/Resources/fee%

20order/o202008.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2011) (providing mediation fees in a
jurisidiction which requires mediation in family law matters like dissolution, allocation of
parental responsiblities and child support).
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equipoise along diverse entry points (e.g., books or videos on stress reduction,
yoga, martial arts, meditation).
One of the most promising places in which the developmental goal of
equipoise might be introduced more robustly is through mediation.134 The core
techniques used in consensus-building processes, like mediation, introduce
participants to a form of equipoise. Leading researchers in this area have described
some of the techniques in the following shorthand: separate the people from the
problem, focus on interests rather than positions, invent options for mutual gain,
and use objective criteria. 135
Consider "separate the people from the problem" in more detail to discern
how it introduces notions of equipoise. The researchers describe the challenge as
follows: "Everyone knows how hard it is to deal with a problem without people
misunderstanding each other, getting angry or upset, and taking things
personally."l 3 6 To effectively respond to that challenge, negotiators need to be able
to discern separately the contours of the substantive problem and the contours of
the relationships of the people at the negotiating table (the "people problem"). 37
Each problem is then dealt with independently, with the people problem requiring
parties to recognize their emotions and the emotions of others untied to the
underlying substantive issues, and to respond to emotional content directly, instead
of burying it within the substantive issue.' 3 8 The teasing apart of "people" from
"problem" encourages participants to attend to emotions, while also encouraging
participants to resist responding only to emotions. By refocusing on underlying
substantive issues, participants gain some time to internally reflect on emotions
before having to respond. In other words, participants gain moments of equipoise.
Further, mediators themselves have recognized the benefits of a practice of
equipoise for their own work, developed through contemplative practices like
mindfulness meditation. Leonard Riskin is exemplary in this area, having written
extensively about the ways in which mindfulness meditation makes for better ADR
practitioners (as well as for better lawyers).139 Riskin notes that mindfulness
134 In fact, I expect that some mediators reading this Article would say that mediation
already robustly incorporates equipoise as a primary component. Len Riskin has been a
leading voice for the benefits to a mediator of a contemplative practice. Riskin founded and
leads the Initiative on Mindfulness in Law and Dispute Resolution at the University of

Florida Levin College of Law. The Initiative on Mindfulness in Law & Dispute Resolution,
LAW.UFL.EDU, http://www.law.ufl.edu/imldr/ (last
135 FISHER & URY, supra note 15, at 15-81.

visited Aug. 19, 2011).

I36 Id. at 17.
'Id. at 18-21.
3 Id. at 22-25, 29-32. For further examples of how the Getting to Yes techniques
include equipoise, see Don Ellinghausen, Jr., Venting or Vipassana? Mindfulness
Meditation's PotentialFor Reducing Anger's Role in Mediation, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 63, 73-74 (2006).
139 See Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute
Resolution, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79 (2004); Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer:
On the PotentialBenefits of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers and Their
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practices help prevent having a "limiting mind set," which can preclude a mediator
from fully listening, from being aware of her own habitual reactions, and from
envisioning the broadest set of potential solutions and challenges to a problem.' 4 0
Family courts likely have a cadre of mediation professionals already familiar and
skillful in emotional equipoise who would be able to assist the court in adjusting
the existing court-annexed progrars to foreground training and practices related to
equipoise.
As the above discussion illustrates, there should be low-cost ways for a
family court to build into existing court-annexed programs more overt training
related to equipoise. Nonetheless, to the extent spouses, parents, or children want
to, or may need to, have further training to develop equipoise, that may require
them to have additional resources. It takes money to sign up for classes at a
YMCA or to participate in a local sports team. For some families, the issue may be
only one of switching to equipoise-related activities. But for many low-income
families they have no extra resources to pay for those activities. That may
constrain how much equipoise training a court can mandate, but a family court still
would be able to look for ways to encourage parties to make the choices they do
have available to them in ways that support a developmental goal of equipoise.
However, regardless of cost, the court will not be able to control training
outcomes. The willingness and ability to learn emotional equipoise ultimately
resides with the parent, spouse or child. Nonetheless, a court can be consistent and
repeated in the way it encourages families to take full advantage of the
opportunities to learn equipoise, and in the ways it requires court-annexed
programs like parenting classes and mediation to include instruction on equipoise.
The move to equipoise is beneficial for all who choose to learn, and that, in turn, is
beneficial for family courts, even if the move does not pick up all participants.
That beneficial turn leads to the final practical question for a family court:
Will equipoise increase the likelihood that participants will not need to return to
court after their original proceeding? As noted in Section II, changing the frame of
family law cases to adopt equipoise as a mode of thinking is of little practical
assistance to a court if that change does not also help the court better manage its
docket. One way a family court's docket could be helped is if it did not have to

Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2002); see also Clark Freshman, After Basic
Mindfulness Meditation: External Mindfulness, Emotional Truthfulness, and Lie Detection
in Dispute Resolution, 2006 J. DiSP. RESOL. 511 (2006) (discussing author's development
of a more advanced mindfulness practice to be used in dispute resolution processes);
Ellinghausen, supra note 135 (comparing'a mindfulness practice with approaches that
encourage venting of emotion and arguing that a mindfulness approach is a more
productive mediation strategy).
140 Compare Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 136, at 48-57, with Scott
R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A BriefIntroduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in
Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83 (2002) (arguing that one risk of a mindfulness
practice in negotiation is that mindfulness requires compassion for others to a degree that
may impinge on a negotiator's ability to remain true to partisan interests).
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address contested post-decree filings. 14 1 Thus, family law courts should be
skeptical of changes that do little to relieve the court's docket.
Ultimately, whether encouraging practices of equipoise will relieve a court's
docket will be an empirical question, which can be answered most accurately post
hoc. Helpfully, some of the research already noted in this Article suggests that
equipoise will enable participants to better navigate conflict.142 First-person
accounts of equipoise practices like meditation also support that equipoise better
enables a person to manage disagreement and conflict. 4 3 Given the evidence thus
far on practices of equipoise, even if only one family member learns the practice of
equipoise, that should still increase the chances that later disagreements can be
resolved without the need to return to court.
Further, to the extent participants do return because they have been unable to
move out of unhelpful emotional cycles like hate or anger, the court can take the
opportunity to encourage the parties once again towards equipoise. For example, if
a jurisdiction requires mediation for its original family law filings, and it has
required approved mediators to incorporate equipoise practices, the court could
additionally mandate that the parties return to mediation in a contested post-decree
filing before the court will hear the post-decree motion.14 4 Again, the best that a
family court can do is inform, encourage, and re-encourage family members to
make the effort to learn practices of equipoise. Adopting a policy of equipoise is
not a magic wand that a family court can wave to clear away all high-conflict cases
from its docket. Nonetheless, equipoise should make a meaningful difference to a
court's docket, as well as case resolutions.
V. CAN FAMILY LAW LOSE WITH EQuIPOISE?

Equipoise offers family courts a mode of processing information and
emotions that usefully supports policy choices as well as practically assists courts.
In this section, I consider whether the choice of equipoise comes at any costs to
It is a minimal burden on the court's docket to handle uncontested post-decree
filings since in those instances the parties generally are filing a joint document in which
they agree on modifications, and to which the court needs only to review and give its
assent. It is only those post-decree matters in which the parties cannot agree how to modify
parenting time, child support or the like, which burden the court. Those matters generally
require the court to hold a hearing and issue a written ruling.
142 See supranotes 123-25 & 138-39.
141

143 STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFACTION IN

43-76 (10th ed. 2009) (chronicling several first-person accounts of
lawyers who have benefitted in their legal practice from contemplative exercises).
144 The jurisdiction in which my students and I practice family law has such a postdecree mediation requirement. While local mediators are not required to incorporate
equipoise practices into their work, many do. In my experience with post-decree
mediations, mediators talk with the parties about the fact that they have had to return to
mediation once again, and spend some time in mediation working with the parties on
developing conflict resolution strategies for the longer term.
THE LEGAL LIFE
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family law, its courts, or participants. I examine four potential risks. First, that the
move to equipoise brings with it an unhelpful move away from the adversary
system, which hurts the least powerful members of a family-like an abused
spouse. Second, that the move to equipoise is too intrusive on individuals and their
own choices-the problem of individual autonomy. Third, that the move to
equipoise asks too much of many individuals-the problem of individual
competency. Finally, that the move to equipoise asks too much of family court
judges, who are trained in the law but not in therapeutic interventions-the
problem of institutional competency.
A. The Adversary System Protects the Less Powerful Members of a Family

For those concerned with power dynamics in court processes, the adversary
system is held out as an effective way to level imbalances. The weaker party gains
strength and protection from having a zealous advocate (the lawyer), and from
having all decisions made by a neutral third party (the judge), whose only job is to
impartially apply the law.14 5 Under the ideal of the adversary system, power
imbalances are negated by a set of checks and balances that are available to every
litigant equally.14 6 According to adversary system proponents, those checks and
balances are upset to the extent a court or a legislature moves away from the
adversary system-either by engaging judges more fully in court processes 4 7 or
by grafting on court-annexed dispute resolution processes.1 48
There are two flaws in the above argument. First, it presumes that the
adversary system in place on the ground in courthouses around the country is, in
fact, the ideal adversary system with all litigants represented by equally competent
counsel. That assumption is false as can be seen from the statistics cited earlier in
this Article about the percentages of pro se parties appearing in family cases.
Further, any lawyer in practice can confirm that there is no uniform level of skill
among lawyers, and parties regularly have lawyers with different skill levels. Once
it is no longer factually true that every litigant is equipped with an equally-skilled
145 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS
ch. 2 (3d ed. 2004); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374

(1982) (decrying the advent of case management in which judges engage with litigants
from pre-trial forward and thereby lose objectivity and neutrality); but see DEBORAH L.
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53-58 (2000)
(describing the "premises of partisanship" of the adversary system and rejecting them);
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY ch. 4 (1988) (for a
thoroughgoing description of the adversary system by an opponent of the adversary
system).
146 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 145, at 36-38 (noting the appropriateness of
the role of "checks and balances" in the adversary system).
147 See Resnik, supra note 145.
148 See Grillo, supra note 2, at 1552 (arguing that mediation can present particular
disadvantages for women because the process can exacerbate power imbalances, thus,
women might be better served within the adversary system).
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advocate, the checking power of lawyer equals falls away. The lesser-equipped
litigant is at risk of losing, not on the merits, but because of gamesmanship. Given
that the ideal. of the adversary system does not exist on the ground, it is not an
appropriate comparison for a system that has adopted equipoise.
Next, the pro-adversary system argument suggests that non-adversarial
problem solving necessarily means that one side capitulated to the demands of the
other. It does not. The practice of equipoise does not ask a person to set aside or
capitulate to challenging interpersonal dynamics, but instead to acknowledge them
and to take time to reflect on the force exerted by those dynamics in triggering a
patterned response. By making salient those interpersonal dynamics, equipoise
offers an opportunity for the less powerful person in the relationship to imagine
more choices about how to respond.
I am not asserting that equipoise guarantees that the less powerful person will
find it easier to act contrary to a pattern hoped for by the more powerful person,
only that equipoise does not demand capitulation. In cases of extreme power
imbalance, or when one participant insists on deploying the adversary system in an
extreme and dysfunctional manner, it remains appropriate for the court, counsel,
and court-annexed personnel to intervene more fully on behalf of the less powerful
participant.14 9
B. The Problem ofIndividualAutonomy
Some may object that adopting *a goal of equipoise will intrude
inappropriately on individual autonomy-that choices about one's emotional wellbeing are deeply personal and not an arena that family courts should intrude upon.
Here, the worry of state intrusion misperceives the nature of equipoise. At its core,
equipoise is a simple (but not necessarily easy) practice of good cognition. Its
starting goal is to provide a practitioner with the skills to attend accurately to her
surroundings, including any emotional component, to attend to her response to the
information she perceives without immediately responding, to acknowledge other
possible ways of responding, and only then to choose affirmatively her actual
response. The individual remains fully in control of her response, be it helpful or
unhelpful. Equipoise does not impinge on individual autonomy, but it hopefully
makes one's exercise of autonomy more thoughtful and useful.
There also may be a concern about individual autonomy framed more
largely-that the state exceeds its authority over the private family sphere by
setting any goals whatsoever for a family's emotional development. Whether one
agrees or disagrees with such a broad framing of autonomy, as a very practical
matter, that framing has not carried the day. State legislatures already have made
policy choices that permit the state, through its family courts, to intercede in the
149 In those high conflict cases, a practice of equipoise may become less effective as a
matter of pragmatic court policy, but becomes substantially more important as a well-being
practice for a participant who feels captured in the conflict by a contentious spouse or
partner.
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family. 5 o Those policy choices already demonstrate that the state has adopted a
developmental cycle more dynamic than the Love-Hate Model. Given our political
and policy reality, the more helpful task now is to refine those policy choices in a
way that increases the possibilities for positive emotional outcomes for family
members, which in turn benefits the courts.
C. The Problem ofIndividual Competency

Regardless of concerns about individual autonomy, another possible
challenge of equipoise is that for too many people it is too hard to learn or to
achieve. Thus, it would be inefficient or futile to have the courts involved in
efforts to teach equipoise. As noted earlier, it will take further empirical work to
establish whether any particular equipoise practice is sufficiently effective to
warrant a court's resources. The best we can do at this a priori stage is to consider
other arenas in which equipoise practices exist and examine whether we see
excessive barriers to participation and learning.' 5 '
One salient barrier may be that participants would perceive the practices as
too weird, or uncomfortable, or culturally off-putting for them. (The person who
does not have a regular exercise regime who cannot imagine going to a class
where one spends most of the time confined to a 2 x 4 foot rubber mat. Or, the
person who understands meditation to be part of a religious practice, and who
considers herself to be unreligious. Or, the person of color who browses yoga
videos and sees only white instructors.) Another barrier may be participants'
perception that equipoise practices will demand time from them that they do not
otherwise feel they have. (The single parent who wakes up, gets the kids to school,
works all day, picks up the kids, gets them fed, helps them with their homework,
and then falls into bed, exhausted.) A final barrier may be that participants
understand the practice to ask them to behave perfectly at all times. In other words,
to become a saint or a Buddha, a goal that understandably feels out of reach.
Each of the above barriers can be mitigated by thoughtful planning by family
courts. Courts can introduce equipoise practices incrementally in familiar and
accessible language, with awareness of cultural diversity, and with different entry
points. Courts can emphasize that equipoise is a "practice"-meaning that practice
presumes good, mediocre and poor performances throughout the course of a
'so I note, also, that trumping individual autonomy is not unique to family law. In
many substantive legal areas, the law has developed in ways that impinge on individual
autonomy. For example, contract law prohibits certain contracts of adhesion. See E.ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §4.26 (3d ed. 2004). Local governments
make choices about gun ownership, subject to Constitutional limitations. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). Tort law imposes
liability for certain kinds of reckless behavior. See STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F.
KRAUSE, ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 10.12 (2008).
15' For purposes of this discussion, I am not considering the barrier of cost. Should a
court adopt equipoise practices, I am assuming it will do so in a way that minimizes cost in
order to accommodate the financial limits ofpro se parties.
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participant's efforts. Thus, perfection is not expected and failures do not get one
"kicked out of the program."
For example, a family court might start each case with a status conference at
which a judge or a court assistant describes goals for the process including
acknowledging the presence of strong emotions and a description of the
participants developing the ability to jointly problem-solve without court
intervention. 152 The judge or court assistant could also describe what will be
included in the mandated parenting class, describing some of the problem-solving
role plays and might conclude by providing a list of local resources, including
materials related to equipoise. The list could include books or videos available
through the public library, local yoga classes, relevant sports programs, stress
reduction groups, relevant programs through local churches or community groups,
meditation groups and the like. The introduction will be built upon by subsequent
activities like parenting classes and mediation during which instructors can work
more specifically with participants on issues like time management and finding
equipoise practices that are comfortable and accessible given participants' interests
and backgrounds. Instructors can also work through the choices participants have
when they respond without employing equipoise, so that participants become
comfortable with the idea of equipoise as an ongoing effort, not a constant state of
emotional repose.
Despite a family cdurt's efforts to introduce equipoise practices in accessible
ways, it certainly will be the case that equipoise practices will be unobtainable by
some participants. Some participants will refuse to consider proceeding in any way
other than with anger and hostility. There will be participants who are distracted
by other issues who cannot fully engage in the family matter. Those categories of
participants already exist. Equipoise will not eliminate that completely nor need it
do so. To be useful to courts, equipoise need only help a sufficient number of
participants so that courts can move through their family law dockets with
reasonable speed, accuracy and fairness. The fact that equipoise, like any other
policy commitment, cannot be a cure-all should not deter family courts from
exploring its efficacy.
D. The Problem oflnstitutionalCompetency
Several of the suggestions that I have offered about how a family court could
adopt a goal of equipoise require action by family court judges. For example, I
suggested that judges expand their discussions in status conferences, or expand
their discussions about how partners' relationships are changing from intimate to
business, so that the idea of a business relationship includes practices of equipoise.
In many jurisdictions, most civil cases, including family cases, already start with
some sort of status conference. Thus, the only change required of court personnel is to
build out the content about equipoise to be included in the conference. See, e.g., COLo.
R.Civ. P., R. 16.2(c) (West 2010) (requiring "initial status conference" for all domestic
relations cases).
151
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For some judges, the policy move that family law has already made away from the
Love-Hate Model may have been discomforting. One can imagine judicial
mutterings in back courtroom hallways, "I'm a judge, not a therapist." The notion
is that legal training, from law school through professional practice and onto
judicial training reinforces two fundamental competencies related to judges. First,
knowledge of substantive legal doctrine, and second, the ability to remain aloof
and detached from other participants in front of the court. Judges may worry that
requiring them to lead discussions about equipoise pushes them too far from the
ideal of aloof and detached judging, and too close to a model of judge as therapist.
It would be worrisome if adopting a goal of equipoise required judges to
become therapists. Fortunately, such is not the case. As I have articulated the
model of equipoise, a judge's job is to make clear to the parties that the court is
aware of the descriptive fact that emotions are very salient in family matters, to
note for the parties that it anticipates the family will experience a range of
emotions, and that the court wishes to facilitate a helpful way of responding to
emotions. The judge needs to understand equipoise sufficiently to be able to
articulate its basic premises to the parties. But, the main opportunities for parties to
learn equipoise will happen outside the courtroom, such as by participating with
experts teaching parenting classes or with mediators skilled in equipoise. Finally,
the judge needs to understand equipoise sufficiently to be able to make decisions
in a particular case that encourage, not discourage, equipoise practices. While that
means a judge is partisan, by state mandate, regarding the policy used to make a
decision, the judge remains a neutral arbiter as to the specific application to the
parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The family law revolution needs to invent and implement its satisfying
ending. It is critical that the revolution address the two translation problems it
currently faces-full access to the benefits of reduced adversarialness and clear
delineation of the goals of acknowledging a full and ongoing cycle of emotions.
Crafting a satisfying end to the family law revolution must account for the facts on
the ground showing that a high proportion of participants in family cases appear
pro se and have limited to modest resources. The innovative and unique way
forward is for courts to adopt practices of equipoise as a mode of understanding
and responding to information and emotions. Equipoise is welcoming to all. It does
not discriminate between those with income and those without, or between those
with higher education or those without. It requires no particular background and no
prior training. It turns the theory of a family law revolution into the actuality of a
revolution.

